Last month we discussed the usage of Textual Canons in the
Interpretations of Statutes. The textual canons focus on the language of a
statute or a group of statutes to help courts discern the meaning of an
ambiguous statute. Substantive canons function much differently. When a court
employs a substantive canon in making a decision about the interpretation of a
statute it is basing its decision on some long-standing presumptions about what
the legislature intends. As with textual canons, the prerequisite before employing a substantive canon is there must be an ambiguity in the statute in question.
Rule of Lenity: With regard to criminal law, the rule of lenity is that where a criminal statute is subject to multiple interpretations, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the defendant. See e.g. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
“Charming Betsy”: This canon comes from the Marshall court. In Marshall’s words, “It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, The, 6 U.S. 64, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804). In the language of today, this means that wherever an interpretation of a statute conflicts with international law, courts should interpret the statute in a way that does not conflict.
“Chevron” Deference: This canon is based on another Supreme Court decision dealing with administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute. In, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. the Court articulated the rule that when a statute is silent as to a specific issue related to the statute, courts should defer to administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute where “the agency's [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Constitutional Avoidance: Under this canon, given competing interpretations of a statute, courts should choose a construction which is free of constitutional issues. See e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
Common Law Canon: This canon means that statutes should not be construed as abrogating common law unless the legislature states the intention to abrogate common law explicitly. See e.g. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
Sovereignty Canon: Courts using this canon should interpret statutes with the presumption that the state did not intend to abrogate its own sovereignty, including immunity from prosecution. See e.g. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
Absurdity Canon: This is the presumption that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unjust. See e.g. Aids Support Grp. of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296 (2017).
Rule of Lenity: With regard to criminal law, the rule of lenity is that where a criminal statute is subject to multiple interpretations, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the defendant. See e.g. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
“Charming Betsy”: This canon comes from the Marshall court. In Marshall’s words, “It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, The, 6 U.S. 64, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804). In the language of today, this means that wherever an interpretation of a statute conflicts with international law, courts should interpret the statute in a way that does not conflict.
“Chevron” Deference: This canon is based on another Supreme Court decision dealing with administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute. In, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. the Court articulated the rule that when a statute is silent as to a specific issue related to the statute, courts should defer to administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute where “the agency's [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Constitutional Avoidance: Under this canon, given competing interpretations of a statute, courts should choose a construction which is free of constitutional issues. See e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
Common Law Canon: This canon means that statutes should not be construed as abrogating common law unless the legislature states the intention to abrogate common law explicitly. See e.g. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
Sovereignty Canon: Courts using this canon should interpret statutes with the presumption that the state did not intend to abrogate its own sovereignty, including immunity from prosecution. See e.g. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
Absurdity Canon: This is the presumption that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unjust. See e.g. Aids Support Grp. of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, 477 Mass. 296 (2017).